Opinion on NGO participation in the ENEF conference in Bratislava
Opinion column of Philip Kearney
Together with three otherNuclear Transparency Watch colleagues I attended the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) conference in Bratislava on October 3-4. This opinion piece is anevaluation of the the merits of the on-going NGO involvement in ENEF activities. Some years previously NGO delegates from a number of organisations had decided to withdraw from ENEF due to frustration at the failure to include their perspectives in the proceedings and the outcomes of the meetings. NGOs are now responding invitations from the European Commission and the Forum to re-engage in its deliberations.
The context in Bratislava was welcoming, the conference competently organised and the setting and logistics well matched with similar events elsewhere. The question to be considered was whether the approach and format facilitated inclusion, multiple perspectives and a sense of equality between stakeholders.
I would argue that in spite of genuine attempts to be inclusive, the use of a traditional conference format militates against achieving those outcomes either at the process level or in terms of generating engagement and innovation.
It was noteworthy that in the opening speech on the first evening by Commissioner Šefčovič and in the remarks by the prime ministers, the key EC officials and others on the second day, there were multiple references to the importance of civil society participation and the fact of the web-streaming was continually mentioned as an indication of ENEF commitment to transparency. These added dimensions do constitute improvements and are acknowledged. Unfortunately, they do not constitute a sufficient breakthrough in terms of qualitative enhancement of public participation.
The format of the event was unimaginative, too conventional and traditional. Panels of speakers giving formal presentations with minimal audience involvement simply results in reiterating much that is already known, does not stimulate engagement or participation and basically keeps things the same.
The moderator, Ms Melinda Crane, was excellent and skilful and did a great job within the significant constraints of the format. However, a World Café (or similar) model, using small groups with a much larger civil society participation, would re-energise the format and make the event much more engaging, innovative and relevant.
The inclusion of a few civil society representatives is tokenistic and at too small a scale to have any significant impact. To be fair there were at least four speakers from the CSO sector which constitutes quite a significant proportion, but the traditional format can absorb a high degree of ‘counter-views’ without any significant moderating effect on the over-riding concerns and pre-occupations of the main players in the Forum whose perspectives continue to dominate the narrative.
It will require a significant redesign of the format to make wider participation relevant and meaningful. There were relatively few of ‘us NGOs’ in the audience but my point is that even if we were many more it would not have made a substantive difference if the format remains linear and non-interactive.
It is clear from the conclusions of the 10th Forum Plenary meeting in Prague in 2015 that the ‘crucial involvement of civil society’ is fully recognised and that the ‘general public acceptance deficit is a central issue to be addressed’. It is also clear from the 2016 Plenary that this has not translated yet into substantive engagement and involvement to achieve the ‘strong and effective participation of civil society’ spoken of in those same conclusions. There is quite some way to go.
In its recent communication « Nuclear Illustrative Programme » (PINC) of April 2016, the European Commission states that « the EU legal framework requires increased transparency and public participation in nuclear issues, as well as improving cooperation between all stakeholders. The directives on nuclear safety, radioactive waste and radiation protection referred to above all lay down requirements on availability of information and public participation. (…) In addition, the Commission will continue to promote the dialogue between stakeholders in the European Nuclear Energy Forum ».
There is an openness to NGO engagement on behalf of the wider society. This has been demonstrated in the response to our various proposed changes and additions including:
- NGO speakers
- Participation of a second CSO representative on the steering committee,
- Independent moderators and
- Web-streaming.
These changes should now be built upon to include some of the points mentioned above but most particularly a fundamental redesign of the format to be genuinely participative and interactive. Specialist expertise in running more interactive, multi-stakeholder events should be engaged. Civil society representatives should be included at every level of the Forum’s work and in the planning and implementation of the conferences. To allow this, specific resources have to be dedicated to NGO resourcing, both in preparations and for participation.
Anything less, although well-intentioned, is merely tinkering with a tired formula and will not change it.
In summary:
My impression is that ENEF realises that the prospects for the nuclear industry are tied increasingly to its capacity to engage meaningfully with civil society. It has very limited expertise in effecting this shift and almost no imagination. NTW should urge ENEF to open up, democratise and modernise its processes and procedures and our continued participation should be contingent on them agreeing to such changes.
Philip Kearney,
Management Board,
Nuclear Transparency Watch
November 2016
EURATOM: the nuclear exception
An opinion column of Bender Javor, Member of the European Parliament and member of NTW
Last week the European Commission made a decision on one of its investigations related to the new Nuclear Power Plant, Paks II of Hungary. An infringement procedure was opened because of the lack of compliance with EU public procurement rules after the Hungarian Government directly awarded the nuclear project to Rosatom. In its decision the European Commission approved the reasoning of the Hungarian Government and allowed the project to proceed without competition and without transparent public procurement based on technical exclusivity, stating that only the Russian reactor fits the Hungarian legal requirements. The details of the Commission’s justifications are not published yet, however, without going into details we can draw a clear conclusion: the Paks II agreement is again one of the ad hoc, shady deals of the Commission which follows along the history of the nuclear sector from the very birth of EURATOM.
The idea at the founding of the EU was the creation of a common European market and granting equal access by Member States to scarce resources. The aim was « to make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible » (Schuman Declaration).
Although, the idea of the declaration is still valid, since the early 1950s the world is slowly moving from coal, oil and nuclear to renewable energy sources. Tackling climate change and the need to shift our economy towards sustainability have become core issues of cooperation in Europe and beyond, as for example the Paris Agreement shows. To meet these challenges, the EU amongst others created an ambitious plan of establishing a European Energy Union, further strengthening the EU’s single energy market to ensure that Europe has secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy and to further the original aim of a peaceful Europe.
While European policymaking must react to the challenges of the 21st century, it still has to fit to an outdated legal framework which dates back to the nineteen fifties and which doesn’t treat the different sources of energy equally. This is just absurd. It is as if the information and telecommunication technology market was regulated by unchanged rules since the 1950s. It seems unimaginable. And that’s exactly the case with nuclear energy.
As a primary law, EURATOM and the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU provide different rules and conditions for nuclear energy compared to other sources of energy. In theory, according to Article 194 of the TFEU, renewable energy sources should be prioritised, but in practice nuclear is in a more favourable position because EURATOM seems to be exempted from the market rules. Although Member States are free to choose their energy mix, when it comes to investment in the field of nuclear, any form of support is considered as “facilitation of investment and supporting the EURATOM objectives” (according to Art 2c of the EURATOM) and as such, state aid is lately almost automatically accepted. The European Commission madeits position clear in its decision on Hinkley Point “C”. The news about the possible outcome of the pending Hungarian Paks II state aid case also strengthens such an understanding.
When it comes to new capacity in Europe the Member States should be offering tendering procedures under Article 8 of the Electricity directive: based on technology neutrality so they could choose objectively, under market conditions, to assess which source of energy is cheapest and the most competitive for the future. Unfortunately, the Commission does not consider it applicable to nuclear energy.
In the Brittany case, France chose gas turbines to fulfil the need for new capacity. The Commission opened a case against France under Article 8 as they believed that alternative sources were not considered. But the same rules does not apply to Paks II due to EURATOM.
As I mentioned already public procurement directives are not equally applicable for nuclear and renewables and rules can be easily circumvented. In fact, the Commission is willing to accept that Member States can refer to their own technical specification when discriminating against other suppliers in the nuclear market. In any other sector of the internal market, it would be unacceptable for the Commission and of course for the European Court of Justice.
Under such circumstances, it seems that we have a biased legal environment. It allows discrimination against certain sources of energy, renewables in particular, and there are no equal opportunities on the energy market.
Since the adoption of the Rome Treaty, the treaties have been regularly updated to meet the challenges of the day. EURATOM is unchanged since 1957. The situation could be somewhat improved if there was a coherent and up to date secondary legislation in the field of nuclear on the internal market. But there isn’t. In fact the situation is comparable to a city court basing its legal arguments on a day to day direct interpretation of the Constitution Indeed, here the interpretation depends on the Commission.
The EU definitely needs a predictable strong common energy market, where investors and all Member States can feel certain about their investments and their long-term profit perspectives. But conferring special status on nuclear with exemptions from the European competition and public procurement laws cannot represent common European objectives and a free energy market cannot be built on this foundation in the future.
If the Commission really want a competitive and united energy market, they should interpret and apply the existing rules according to the needs and the conditions of the 21st century and not according to the outdated and short-sighted needs of some Member States or on the ancient traditional views of technocrats. I have no doubt that the European Court of Justice would support a position which takes into consideration the technological and political developments if the final word was theirs.
A CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORK ON EP&R ISSUES
NTW is calling for a network of civil society representatives to monitor closely EP&R situation across Europe.
Latest ACRO[1] and NTW[2] reports have highlighted several relevant findings about Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) issues related to nuclear and radiation accidents. These reports have the same conclusion:
PREPARATION as it is developed now in Europe cannot be considered as adequate in case of a severe accident.
We need a better protection of the population in case of accident, which also implies participation of civil society in planning.
NTW aims to raise the voice of the civil society.
NTW wants to push authorities to define more realistic plans, and this, with the help of the Civil Society. Since 2014, NTW tried to develop the conditions for the civil society to be engaged in the area of EP&R, by giving knowledge and by supporting to be active on EP&R issues.
At European level, one useful tool could be the AtHLET approach written by competent authorities in radiation protection and nuclear safety. Furthermore, by February 2018, EU Member States are required to transpose into national law the Basic Safety Standards Directive 2013 which also includes some provisions related to EP&R.
NTW wants to create a wide European network of civil society organisations.
NTW wants to create a network of NGOs/independent experts to work on EP&R issues to have at least one national partner in each EU country to screen the national situation. We could together push for the emergence of national reports similar to the ones written by ACRO in France and Belgium.
A handbook will help our civil society partners on how to develop a methodology and on how to be an actor. This handbook will give guidelines including international recommendations and good practices found in some countries to screen the national situation. This handbook will also precise vocabulary to facilitate comparisons in Europe and finally create a real matrix of the European situation.
DO YOU WANT TO JOIN THE EP&R NETWORK
OF NUCLEAR TRANSPARENCY WATCH?
Please send a reply to:
Marie-Alix Verhoeven
Déléguée générale / Head of Operations at Nuclear Transparency Watch
E-mail: ma.verhoeven@nuclear-transparency-watch.eu
With the following information:
NAME + COUNTRY + ORGANISATION + E-MAIL ADDRESS
[1] https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/documentation/new-report-nuclear-safety-in-france.html
CLIs and ANCCLI : An example of civil society involvement in governance
A French national network to guarentee transparency and nuclear safety
Around the table, we often have operators, regulators and technical support organisations. But we are often missing a fourth pillar: the civil society. How is civil society organized? What is the influence civil society?
In the context of the governance of nuclear activities, particularly in the field of nuclear safety and nuclear waste management, the vigilance of civil society is necessary. The experience of the French « Local Information Commissions » (CLI) and their national federation, ANCCLI, is an interesting example in Europe of the involvement of civil society on nuclear issues.
A system of involvement of civil society
In France, each basic nuclear installation and assimilated structure benefits from a CLI (Local Information Commission). A CLI has a dual mission of providing information to the public and permanent monitoring of the impact of nuclear installations on the environment. The national federation of CLIs, ANCCLI, was created in 2000. ANCCLI has been formed by the CLIs and is composed (excluding its permanent staff) by representatives of the CLIs from each installation who are representatives of the civil society. ANCCLI promotes the sharing of experiences and brings the voice of the CLIs to the national and international levels. It forges close partnerships with ASN (Nuclear Safety Authority), IRSN (Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety) and HCTISN (High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety). Today, there are 35 CLIs from all over the French territory, they are composed of four panels: local elected people, representatives of environmental protection associations, representatives from nuclear industry trade unions, and qualified persons and representatives of the economic world. CLIs question plant operators, the ASN (Nuclear Safety Authority) or the IRSN (Institute for Radioprotection and Nuclear Safety), organize public discussions, take part in inspections, mandate experts on specific points and organize the radiation monitoring of the environment around the plant. CLIs listen to the requests of the citizens.
History of ANCCLI and the CLIs
The experience of CLIs and ANCCLI also shows that the structure of civil society on nuclear issues is progressive and that a lingering path remains to be travelled. The first Local Information Commission was created in 1977 around Fessenheim NPP.In 1981, as a result of a circular from the Prime Minister, CLIs were created for all NPPs & some other installations.CLIs were officially recognized in 2006 by the Transparency and Nuclear Safety (TSN) Act that provided a legal basis. This basis is confirmed by the new law on energy (TECV). CLIs are under the supervision of the Departemental Council that does not intervene in nuclear safety control (This is a ASN prerogative).
In 2000, ANCCLI was founded as the national representation of CLIs. Article 22 of TSN act says: “(…) a local information committee is (…) tasked with a general follow-up, information and consultation mission in the field of nuclear safety, radioprotection and the impact of nuclear activities on persons and the environment as far as the site installations are concerned.”
The Energy Transition Act from 2015 adds new missions for CLIs (public meetings, consultation on emergency plan updates, etc.).
Influence on nuclear accident preparedness
Several examples show thatANCCLI can change the game in French nuclear accident preparedness.
CLI Gravelines CLI – 2005 – Implementation of a floating boom in the fore-port.
The water used to cool the Gravelines NPP is taken in through a fore-port where there are many ships circulating and where oil tankers are parked at platforms. The CLI of Gravelines raised the problem of risks of marine oil pollution in the fore-port and the risks for the water intake of the nuclear plant.
Following the remarks of the CLI, the French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) requested that the operator produce a study of the problem. This study confirmed the risks posed by the CLI and the ASN imposed on the operator to build a floating boom in the fore-port.
CLI Fessenheim – 2014 – Taking into account the remarks of the Fessenheim-CLI in the update of the regulations on the releases of effluents from the Fessenheim nuclear power plant.
As part of the updating of the regulations on the releases of the Fessenheim nuclear power plant, the CLI-Fessenheim appealed to the Scientific Committee (SC) of ANCCLI to analyse the dossier submitted by the operator. The analysis of the SC allowed the CLIs to propose additions to the regulations planned to be set by the French Safety Authority (ASN): additional measures, monitoring on emerging pollutants, reduction of the limit of other pollutants releases. Some of these CLI s’proposals were taken into account by the ASN.
ANCCLI – 2015 – Extension of special intervention plans.
In a press release dated November 7, 2014, ANCCLI required a thorough review of the perimeters of “special intervention plans“ (“plans particuliers d’intervention” – PPI) of basic nuclear installation and even suggested an extension of the emergency plans to a radius of 80 km. In the report released in April 2015 by ANCCLI on emergency plans strengths and weaknesses, ANCCLI emphasized that, in the light of the Fukushima disaster, the current emergency plans, with a radius of 10 km, were inadequate.
On April 26 2016, the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the Environment Minister Ségolène Royal announced the extension from 10 to 20 km from the scope of the special intervention plans (PPI). This will multiply considerably the populations involved.
Although there is still a lack of action on the part of administrative decision-makers, we can observe a measureable change in the political decision-makers’ view on planning of nuclear safety in France.
An interesting example for Europe
Today, we can observe that ANCCLI is developing its own expertise to play an influential role and to be involved in decision processes. The ANCCLI model of action can be studied and adopted by civil society in other contexts, which would add value to nuclear safety in Europe as a whole. The ANCCLI model is indeed known. For example, in a report by the Belgium High Health Council a transparent and structured communication process is advocated, such as that of the French CLIs, on nuclear safety issues and on emergency planning. It recognises that « this participatory approach improves the quality of vulnerability analyzes, highlights concerns of citizens and allows people to react in case of accident ».
There is a need of civil society involvement at the European level, as stressed by the European Union Council. Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on off-site nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) stresses « the benefits of involving civil society in preparedness activities, in particular during nuclear emergency exercises, to increase transparency and public participation, and to improve public confidence in the arrangements ».
SEMINAR ON PUBLIC INFORMATION IN EP&R
« Addressing the requirements on public information in EP&R from BSS Directive (Articles 70 and 71) »
1st December 2016 in Luxembourg
Seminar co-organised by the European Commission and NTW
OBJECTIVES:
EU Member States are required to transpose into national law the 2013 Basic Safety Standards Directive by February 2018. The 1st December seminar will be dedicated to the topic of public information (Articles 70 and 71 of the BSS Directive (2013/59/Euratom) and Article 8 of the amended nuclear safety Directive (2014/87/Euratom)) on how to ensure good and effective information to the members of public in the preparatory phase and during the emergency phase (Emergency Preparedness and Response – EP&R). This seminar will bring the potential contribution of the Civil Society to ensure an effective and qualitative transposition of the BSS Directive in view of EP&R provisions, and will give recommendations on how to engage civil society in this process.
The Council of the European Union has requested the Commission to organize workshops to facilitate more consistent transposition and implementation of the BSS Directive. A year after the BSS workshop « More effective EP&R arrangements »[1], this event will be an opportunity to share civil society’s experiences and concrete findings in order to support policy makers and regulators in the process of implementing the directive.
Based on civil society’s experiences and findings and taking account of regulators’ views, the aim of the seminar is to putting forward possible concrete solutions and to highlight examples of good practice that are being used today within and outside the EU.
[1] RiskAudit/EC, BSS Topical Workshop, 3 December 2015, Brussels
VIDEOS:
– Azby BROWN, Safecast, Japan
Screening of a video presentation « Innovative tools for emergency response »
« Innovative tools for emergency response » by… par nucleartransparencywatch
– Vincent COVELLO, Director of the Center for Risk Communication, USA
Screening of a video presentation « Emergency communication in USA »
« Emergency communication » by Vincent COVELLO… par nucleartransparencywatch
WITH:
– Ioanna METAXOPOULOU, Head of Unit D2 – DG ENER, European Commission
– Bharat PATEL, Unit D3 – DG ENER, European Commission
– Nadja ZELEZNIK, Chair of Nuclear Transparency Watch
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– Jan Ole Voß , laywer à Becker Büttner Held, Brussels – Europe
– Jean-Claude DELALONDE, chairman of ANCCLI,France
– Jean-Luc LACHAUME, French Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), France
– Pr. Gilbert EGGERMONT, the Belgian Health Council, Belgium
– Albena SIMEONOVA, Foundation for Environment and Agriculture (FEA), Bulgaria
– Dr. Matthias ZÄHRINGER, Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Germany
–Tatiana DURANOVA, VUJE, Slovakia
– Marie-Lène GAAB, ACRO, France,
THE FULL PROGRAM:
Download
The application of the Espoo Convention to nuclear energy-related activities
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention) sets out the obligations to assess the environmental impact of certain activities at an early stage of decision making. It also lays down the general obligation for parties to notify and consult each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse environmental impact across national borders. The purpose of the Espoo Convention is to enhance international co‑operation and allow environmentally sound decisions to be made, paying careful attention to minimising significant adverse impacts, particularly in a transboundary context.
See a complete article in the Nuclear Law Bulletin for information on the relevant provisions of the Espoo Convention applicable to nuclear energy-related activities.
NEW REPORT: Transparency and participation in RWM national programmes
A new report from the Joint Project
After about a year’s experience with available national waste management programmes until June 2016 based on Directive 2011/70/Euratom, the Joint Project produced a report about status of national programmes and SEAs in the JP countries. They analysed several aspects of transparency and public participation and their implementation in the countries.
This evaluation is based on selected results from an EU-financed project (BEPPER). While the BEPPER results provided us with a qualified position about transparency and participation from a societal and also scientific viewpoint (good practice), recent experience shows that this good practice mostly is not or only partially reflected in national programmes. Therefore a “reality check” of the national programmes of the Joint Project countries (if available) was carried out with the aim of identifying the Member states ́ approaches and comparing them to the recommendations of international good practice of transparency and participation, identifying inconsistencies and developing recommendations for improvement of the implementation of Art. 10 of the Waste Directive.
The report can be downloaded here
The joint working group consists of members from Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungaria, Romania and Poland. Current members of the Joint Project are:
- Calla – Association for Preservation of the Environment (CZ)
- South Bohemian Mothers (CZ)
- Energiaklub (HU)
- Za Zemiata (BG)
- Foundation for Environment and Agriculture (BG)
- Terra Mileniul III (RO)
- Association ‘Common Earth’ (‘Wspólna Ziemia’) (PL)
- Austrian Institute of Ecology (AT)
- Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation (HEPF)
HINKLEY POINT C: UK should have consulted possible affected Parties over risks
United Kingdom is not in compliance with the Espoo Convention
The Espoo Convention Compliance Committee[1] has closed its investigation on compliance by the United Kingdom in the case of Hinkley Point C. It found that the United Kingdom has not met its obligations to discuss the impact of a nuclear accident with the affected public in other countries. The findings from the Implementation Committee will be presented for endorsement to the next plenary session of Parties in Minsk in June 2017.
The Espoo Convention Implementation Committee was informed about the matter by the Green member of the German Federal Parliament Sylvia Kötting-Uhl and the NGO Friends of the Irish Environment in March 2013. They alleged that the UK failed to consult the public about the potential transboundary implications of the construction and operation of the proposed Hinkley Point C nuclear reactor.
Austria did participate in the procedure, after it had actively notified its interest under the Espoo Convention. It then showed with its own studies that there should be consultation because of the possibility of a severe accident that could lead to radioactive materials being spread by wind across Europe. At the request of the Espoo Convention Implementation Committee, the Netherlands and Norway also informed that transboundary impacts in their viewpoint could not be excluded. France, Belgium, Ireland, Denmark, Spain and Germany did not challenge the UK claim that transboundary impacts would be impossible.
In its findings, the Implementation Committee concluded that the United Kingdom should have notified countries other than only Ireland of the potential impacts of the Hinkley Point C project. It concluded on the basis of the Guidance on the Practical Application of the Espoo Convention, that « notification is necessary unless a significant adverse transboundary impact can be excluded. » It stated that the fact that the UK agreed to honour the request of notification by Austria means that these two Parties agreed that a likely significant environmental impact on Austrian territory could not be excluded. On the basis of the Austrian study, it noted that a severe accident could also cause significant adverse impact in Austria, France, Germany and Switzerland. It concluded that the originating party should take into account the worst-case scenario.
The Committee recommended that the UK should discuss what to do now with potentially affected Parties and that for all future nuclear power plant construction projects it will have to notify other countries for a transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).
Jan Haverkamp, consultant for Greenpeace and board member of Nuclear Transparency Watch has followed the case closely: “These are important findings for nuclear decision processes in Europe. This confirms that the potential victims of severe accidents in new nuclear power stations have the right to participate in procedures. One of the lessons of the Fukushima catastrophe was that decision makers should think the unthinkable and any installation with a high concentration of highly radioactive material can lead to catastrophic emissions. Whether that is by unforeseen circumstances, acts of terror or war. These findings will help in reducing nuclear risks.”
Two complaints at the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee for lack of international public participation in the Hinkley Point C project are still ongoing with findings expected before the end of the year.
The final conclusions are in the Annex of the report of the Committee’s 35th session (page 12 and further):
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2015/EIA/IC/ece.mp.eia.ic.2016.2.advance_copy_for_typo_3.pdf
Find all related documentation on:
http://www.unece.org/environmental-policy/conventions/environmental-assessment/areas-of-work/review-of-compliance/committee-initiative/eiaicci5-united-kingdom.html
[1] The UNECE Espoo Convention, named for the Finnish town in which it was signed in 1991, requires governments to provide an opportunity to the public in transboundary areas likely to be affected by a project to participate in the relevant Environmental Impact Assessment procedures regarding proposed activities. It must ensure that the opportunity provided to the public of potentially affected Parties is ‘equivalent to that provided to the public of the Party of origin’.



















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