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Nuclear Transparency Watch

Prevent and anticipate through transparency and participation

Opinion Columns

WEBINAR – ANCCLI’s position regarding IRSN dismantling project by the French government

Today, Monday 13 March is an important date in the evolution of the IRSN dismantling project decided by the French government early February, in fact IRSN more united than ever is demonstrating again today against this decision considered rushed and unjustified.

… [Read More]

SITEX.Network concerns about the sustainability of IRSN

As a member of the SITEX.Network, NTW is sharing this statement from the network involving technical and citizen organisations:

SITEX.Network is concerned about the recent news that IRSN, one of its members, may be dissolved during the reorganization of the French nuclear safety governance currently under discussion.

… [Read More]

UNITED KINGDOM: letter from NTW’s member published in Cumbrian newspaper

Here is the letter including reference to new UK legislation, published in Cumbrian newspapers by NTW member Tim Knowles the 19 February 2023:

“Sir,

As predicted the investment bonanzas forecast by our politicians over the last decade have failed to materialise. Moorside, the National Grid upgrade, new high quality roads, rail improvements etc etc have proved to be hot air. Yes there are a few “town deals”, but these don’t start to replace the money cut from Cumbrian council budgets during the period. … [Read More]

CALL for a post-Ukraine nuclear stress test process for all European nuclear power stations

After Russia’s shocking invasion of Ukraine last year, the nuclear risk has come back to the forefront in a worrying way.

Indeed, the day after the invasion, on 25 February 2022, the armies of the Russian Federation attacked the Chornobyl power station and a few days later the largest power station in Europe: Zaporizhzhia
👉 find here ENSREG statement

… [Read More]

WEBINAR: Euratom Reform and Options for EU Treaty – Change in the Energy Field #1

Initiation of a constitutional amendment procedure in the European Union seems increasingly likely due to the positions on treaty reform of the European Parliament, the European Commission, France and Germany as well as other EU member states. The aim of the webinar is to discuss the need of reform or abolishment of the Euratom Treaty and how EU’s constitutional framework could look like if it included mechanisms for an efficient and timely green energy transition.

Time: February 20th, 3-4 PM, CET.

… [Read More]

How much will it really cost to decommission the ageing French nuclear fleet ?

Dr Paul Dorfman
NTW Member
Honorary Senior Research Associate, Energy Institute, UCL
Founder, ncg

Faisabilité Technique et Financière du Démantèlement des Infrastructures Nucléaires
The issue of decommissioning costs is a key challenge in the nucear sector. Perhaps surprisingly, a recently published French Governmental report on Faisabilité technique et financière du démantèlement des infrastructures nucléaires, from Le Commission du Développement Durable et de l’Aménagement du Territoire, Assemblée Nationale, has just blown a significant hole in the French decommissioning strategy.
http://www2.assemblee-nationale.fr/documents/notice/14/rap-info/i4428/%28index%29/depots

In late January this year, on the last day of the Commissions work, the Committee took evidence from the EDF head of decommissioning and me. Given the Commission had been working on this for months, and had listened to mounds of complex data, I decided to cut to the chase and make as clear an argument as I could. What follows is that evidence.

How much has France, Germany and UK set aside for decommissioning ?
Whereas Germany has set aside €38 billion to decommission 17 nuclear reactors, and the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) estimates that clean-up of UK’s 17 nuclear sites will cost between €109 – €250 billion over the next 120 years – France has set aside only €23 billion for the decommissioning of its 58 reactors. To put this in context, according to the European Commission, France estimates it will cost €300 million per gigawatt (GW) of generating capacity to decommission a nuclear reactor – far below Germany’s assumption at €1.4 billion per GW and the UK of €2.7 billion per GW.

How can EDF decommission at such low cost?
EDF maintain that because of standardisation of some of the reactors and because there are multiple reactors located on single sites, they can decommissioning at a low cost. Does this claim stack up ? Well, probably not. Reactors are complex pieces of kit, and each has a differing operational and safety history. In other words, nuclear reactor decommissioning is essentially a
‘bespoke’ process.

Why has EDF underestimated the costs of decommissioning 
and waste storage ?
Even EDFs €23 billion limited provision for decommissioning and waste storage is a large sum of money for a company that has huge borrowings and enormous debt, which is currently running at €37 billion, Standard and Poor and Moodys (the two biggest international credit rating agencies) have already downgraded EDFs credit-worthiness over the corporations potentially ill-advised decision to go ahead with attempting to construct two more of the failing Areva reactor design (the EPR) at Hinkley Point, UK. And any significant change in the cost of decommissioning would have an immediate and disastrous impact on EDFs credit rating – something that the debt-ridden corporation can simply not afford.

Spent nuclear fuel build-up
Then there’s EDF’s existential problems at France’s high-level waste storage and reprocessing facility at La Hague, where spent nuclear fuel stores are reaching current cooling capacity limits. This means La Hague may now have to turn away spent fuel shipments from Frances reactor fleet. In any case, since ASN have identified safety problems with some spent fuel transport flasks, spent fuel transport to La Hague has substantially slowed. All this means the build-up of spent fuel at nuclear sites across France, with the associated problem of cooling the spent fuel at nuclear sites during dry summer periods, with all that means for further escalation of rad-waste management costs.

French National Assembly Commission Findings
Happily, and perhaps unexpectedly, when the Commission publishes it’s final key findings, they come down on the side of those who voiced concerns about EDFs provisioning for reactor decommissioning and waste management does not include “obvious under-provisioning” regarding “certain heavy expenses”, such as taxes and insurance, remediation of contaminated soil, the reprocessing of used fuel and the social impact of decommissioning. The Commission found that the clean-up of French reactors will take longer, be more challenging and cost much more than EDF anticipates.

The Commission reports that EDF showed “excessive optimism” in the decommissioning of its nuclear power plants. “Other countries have embarked on the dismantling of their power plants, and the feedback we have generally contradicts EDF’s optimism about both the financial and technical aspects of decommissioning… “The cost of decommissioning is likely to be greater than the provisions”, the technical feasibility is “not fully assured” and the dismantling work will take “presumably more time than expected”.

Critically, the Commissions report says that EDF arrived at its cost estimate by extrapolating to all sites the estimated costs for decommissioning a generic plant comprising four 900 MWe reactors, such as Dampierre, noting that: “The initial assumption according to which the dismantling of the whole fleet will be homogeneous is questioned by some specialists who argue that each reactor has a particular history with different incidents that have occurred during its history”.

So what now?
Soon EDF will have to start the biggest, most complex and costliest nuclear decommissioning and radioactive waste management programme on earth. It seems very likely that (for various reasons not unassociated with it’s current bank balance) EDF may have seriously underestimated the real challenges and costs, with serious consequences for its already unhealthy balance sheet. This will have profound consequences for the French State, who underwrite EDF.

Taken up in the Press:

China Dialogue:

Opinion on NGO participation in the ENEF conference in Bratislava

 Opinion column of Philip Kearney

Together with three otherNuclear Transparency Watch colleagues I attended the European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF) conference in Bratislava on October 3-4. This opinion piece is anevaluation of the the merits of the on-going NGO involvement in ENEF activities. Some years previously NGO delegates from a number of organisations had decided to withdraw from ENEF due to frustration at the failure to include their perspectives in the proceedings and the outcomes of the meetings. NGOs are now responding invitations from the European Commission and the Forum to re-engage in its deliberations.

The context in Bratislava was welcoming, the conference competently organised and the setting and logistics well matched with similar events elsewhere. The question to be considered was whether the approach and format facilitated inclusion, multiple perspectives and a sense of equality between stakeholders.

I would argue that in spite of genuine attempts to be inclusive, the use of a traditional conference format militates against achieving those outcomes either at the process level or in terms of generating engagement and innovation.

It was noteworthy that in the opening speech on the first evening by Commissioner Šefčovič and in the remarks by the prime ministers, the key EC officials and others on the second day, there were multiple references to the importance of civil society participation and the fact of the web-streaming was continually mentioned as an indication of ENEF commitment to transparency. These added dimensions do constitute improvements and are acknowledged. Unfortunately, they do not constitute a sufficient breakthrough in terms of qualitative enhancement of public participation.

The format of the event was unimaginative, too conventional and traditional. Panels of speakers giving formal presentations with minimal audience involvement simply results in reiterating much that is already known, does not stimulate engagement or participation and basically keeps things the same.

The moderator, Ms Melinda Crane, was excellent and skilful and did a great job within the significant constraints of the format. However, a World Café (or similar) model, using small groups with a much larger civil society participation, would re-energise the format and make the event much more engaging, innovative and relevant.

The inclusion of a few civil society representatives is tokenistic and at too small a scale to have any significant impact. To be fair there were at least four speakers from the CSO sector which constitutes quite a significant proportion, but the traditional format can absorb a high degree of ‘counter-views’ without any significant moderating effect on the over-riding concerns and pre-occupations of the main players in the Forum whose perspectives continue to dominate the narrative.

It will require a significant redesign of the format to make wider participation relevant and meaningful. There were relatively few of ‘us NGOs’ in the audience but my point is that even if we were many more it would not have made a substantive difference if the format remains linear and non-interactive.

It is clear from the conclusions of the 10th Forum Plenary meeting in Prague in 2015 that the ‘crucial involvement of civil society’ is fully recognised and that the ‘general public acceptance deficit is a central issue to be addressed’. It is also clear from the 2016 Plenary that this has not translated yet into substantive engagement and involvement to achieve the ‘strong and effective participation of civil society’ spoken of in those same conclusions. There is quite some way to go.

In its recent communication “Nuclear Illustrative Programme ” (PINC) of April 2016, the European Commission states that “the EU legal framework requires increased transparency and public participation in nuclear issues, as well as improving cooperation between all stakeholders. The directives on nuclear safety, radioactive waste and radiation protection referred to above all lay down requirements on availability of information and public participation. (…) In addition, the Commission will continue to promote the dialogue between stakeholders in the European Nuclear Energy Forum”.

There is an openness to NGO engagement on behalf of the wider society. This has been demonstrated in the response to our various proposed changes and additions including:

  • NGO speakers
  • Participation of a second CSO representative on the steering committee,
  • Independent moderators and
  • Web-streaming.

These changes should now be built upon to include some of the points mentioned above but most particularly a fundamental redesign of the format to be genuinely participative and interactive. Specialist expertise in running more interactive, multi-stakeholder events should be engaged. Civil society representatives should be included at every level of the Forum’s work and in the planning and implementation of the conferences. To allow this, specific resources have to be dedicated to NGO resourcing, both in preparations and for participation.

Anything less, although well-intentioned, is merely tinkering with a tired formula and will not change it.

In summary:

My impression is that ENEF realises that the prospects for the nuclear industry are tied increasingly to its capacity to engage meaningfully with civil society. It has very limited expertise in effecting this shift and almost no imagination. NTW should urge ENEF to open up, democratise and modernise its processes and procedures and our continued participation should be contingent on them agreeing to such changes.

Philip Kearney,
Management Board,
Nuclear Transparency Watch
November 2016

EURATOM: the nuclear exception

An opinion column of Bender Javor, Member of the European Parliament and member of NTW

Last week the European Commission made a decision on one of its investigations related to the new Nuclear Power Plant, Paks II of Hungary. An infringement procedure was opened because of the lack of compliance with EU public procurement rules after the Hungarian Government directly awarded the nuclear project to Rosatom. In its decision the European Commission approved the reasoning of the Hungarian Government and allowed the project to proceed without competition and without transparent public procurement based on technical exclusivity, stating that only the Russian reactor fits the Hungarian legal requirements. The details of the Commission’s justifications are not published yet, however, without going into details we can draw a clear conclusion: the Paks II agreement is again one of the ad hoc, shady deals of the Commission which follows along the history of the nuclear sector from the very birth of EURATOM.

The idea at the founding of the EU was the creation of a common European market and granting equal access by Member States to scarce resources. The aim was “to make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (Schuman Declaration).

Although, the idea of the declaration is still valid, since the early 1950s the world is slowly moving from coal, oil and nuclear to renewable energy sources. Tackling climate change and the need to shift our economy towards sustainability have become core issues of cooperation in Europe and beyond, as for example the Paris Agreement shows. To meet these challenges, the EU amongst others created an ambitious plan of establishing a European Energy Union, further strengthening the EU’s single energy market to ensure that Europe has secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy and to further the original aim of a peaceful Europe.

While European policymaking must react to the challenges of the 21st century, it still has to fit to an outdated legal framework which dates back to the nineteen fifties and which doesn’t treat the different sources of energy equally. This is just absurd. It is as if the information and telecommunication technology market was regulated by unchanged rules since the 1950s. It seems unimaginable. And that’s exactly the case with nuclear energy.

As a primary law, EURATOM and the Treaty of the Functioning of the EU provide different rules and conditions for nuclear energy compared to other sources of energy. In theory, according to Article 194 of the TFEU, renewable energy sources should be prioritised, but in practice nuclear is in a more favourable position because EURATOM seems to be exempted from the market rules. Although Member States are free to choose their energy mix, when it comes to investment in the field of nuclear, any form of support is considered as “facilitation of investment and supporting the EURATOM objectives” (according to Art 2c of the EURATOM) and as such, state aid is lately almost automatically accepted. The European Commission madeits position clear in its decision on Hinkley Point “C”. The news about the possible outcome of the pending Hungarian Paks II state aid case also strengthens such an understanding.

When it comes to new capacity in Europe the Member States should be offering tendering procedures under Article 8 of the Electricity directive: based on technology neutrality so they could choose objectively, under market conditions, to assess which source of energy is cheapest and the most competitive for the future. Unfortunately, the Commission does not consider it applicable to nuclear energy.

In the Brittany case, France chose gas turbines to fulfil the need for new capacity. The Commission opened a case against France under Article 8 as they believed that alternative sources were not considered. But the same rules does not apply to Paks II due to EURATOM.

As I mentioned already public procurement directives are not equally applicable for nuclear and renewables and rules can be easily circumvented. In fact, the Commission is willing to accept that Member States can refer to their own technical specification when discriminating against other suppliers in the nuclear market. In any other sector of the internal market, it would be unacceptable for the Commission and of course for the European Court of Justice.

Under such circumstances, it seems that we have a biased legal environment. It allows discrimination against certain sources of energy, renewables in particular, and there are no equal opportunities on the energy market.

Since the adoption of the Rome Treaty, the treaties have been regularly updated to meet the challenges of the day. EURATOM is unchanged since 1957. The situation could be somewhat improved if there was a coherent and up to date secondary legislation in the field of nuclear on the internal market. But there isn’t. In fact the situation is comparable to a city court basing its legal arguments on a day to day direct interpretation of the Constitution Indeed, here the interpretation depends on the Commission.

The EU definitely needs a predictable strong common energy market, where investors and all Member States can feel certain about their investments and their long-term profit perspectives. But conferring special status on nuclear with exemptions from the European competition and public procurement laws cannot represent common European objectives and a free energy market cannot be built on this foundation in the future.

If the Commission really want a competitive and united energy market, they should interpret and apply the existing rules according to the needs and the conditions of the 21st century and not according to the outdated and short-sighted needs of some Member States or on the ancient traditional views of technocrats. I have no doubt that the European Court of Justice would support a position which takes into consideration the technological and political developments if the final word was theirs.

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