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Nuclear Transparency Watch

Prevent and anticipate through transparency and participation

Bulgaria: NPP Kozloduy and SLAPP case against citizen Natalia Stancheva

NTW is happy to inform about the unprecedented claim of 500,000 BGN (253,837 euro) – a SLAPP case filed by the Kozlody Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) against the nurse Nataliya Stancheva who revealed violations of the law at the Bulgarian nuclear power plant – has been withdrawn (see NTW’s position on the case below).

After Nuclear Transparency Watch, Dr. Petar Kardzilov reached out to the Bulgarian media and organized a protest in front of the Ministry of Energy in defense of Nataliya Stancheva. Publications in leading media and an invitation to Natalya and him on an evening talk show followed. All this contributed to putting pressure on the Kozloduy NPP to withdraw their shameful lawsuit against the woman who exposed the corruption scheme with the polyclinic operating at the NPP site using her right according to the Access to Public Information Act.
 
However, now, according to Natalia’s information, the illegal polyclinic continues to function and no one in the state is checking and taking action to eliminate it. Actions in this direction are also forthcoming with Dr. Petar Kardzilov’s colleagues from Bulgaria at NTW, Albena Simeonova and Borislav Sandov. According to Natalia’s information, a bank, pharmacy, shops and other illegal sites also operate at the site of the Kozloduy NPP. Below are the media publications in Bulgarian.
Publications after the position of NTW and the gathering in support of Natalia Stancheva before the Ministry of Energy:
 
An international organization calls on the Kozloduy NPP to withdraw a case against a citizen
Citizens protest in defense of the nurse fired from Kozloduy NPP
Kozloduy NPP to withdraw the claim against an employee who revealed violations, European organization called
Protest after an unprecedented claim for half a million BGN of Kozloduy NPP against a former employee
Protest in support of the nurse sued by the Kozloduy NPP for BGN 500,000 in a slap case. The case is an embarrassment to the management of the plant. Brutal, unheard of and unprecedented insolence, said the non-governmental organization Nuclear Transparency Watch
On the territory of the « Kozloduy » NPP there is also… a pharmacy, a restaurant, a bank This is what Petar Kardjilov from Nuclear Transparency Watch claims
In support of Natalia Stancheva – citizens protested in front of the Ministry of Energy
UNHEARD OF: « Kozloduy » NPP prosecuted its employee with a lawsuit for half a million BGN! The office of occupational medicine at the headquarters has been turned into an unregistered polyclinic, the woman reveals
A former employee of Kozloduy NPP is being sued for BGN 500,000, they defended her during a protest
Slavi Trifonov’s evening show, January 25, 2024.

 

… [En savoir plus]

Article on Rosatom-show in COP28 and other issues

January 6, 2024

Source:Rosatom News

József Kóbor dr.

Pécs City Council, Hungary, European Committee of the Regions, NTW

Undoubtedly, it borders on the absurd that at the largest world environmental congress in 2023, COP28, the biggest appearance was presented by the Russian state nuclear giant ROSATOM. It is even more absurd when you consider that this company is theoretically being boycotted by the so-called “democratic world” due to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Or maybe not .

The Small Modular Reactors (SMR) have become so important for both Rosatom and the entire world that the Russian state-owned company recently dedicated a day to them at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai – an SMR day. In addition, Rosatom conducts negotiations, concludes agreements, develops projects and prepares documentation related to the construction of small power reactors. Nuclear experts from other countries will also be familiarized with small power plants and their operating characteristics.

SMR Day was one of the most important events in Rosatom’s COP28 program. The event began with a vivid multimedia presentation covering the construction of a small, powerful onshore nuclear power plant in Yakutia that will be “carefully” integrated into the Arctic ecosystem.

Guests were able to virtually explore the Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant, which supplies electrical energy and heat to the town of Pevek on the Chukchi Peninsula, Russia’s northernmost city. “I am sure that Rosatom’s small powerful nuclear power plants represent an efficient and environmentally friendly choice for countries that, for various reasons, have not previously thought about their own nuclear energy production,” said Alexey Likhachev, the general director of Rosatom, in his video message to the Participants of the SMR day. The Russian small, powerful nuclear power plants are also interesting for other countries.”

The parties will examine the possibilities and study the location of the mainland SMR, the configuration of the power plant and the infrastructure required for construction and operation, and select the optimal implementation model for the project.

Hearing all this, an expert who has worked in the nuclear industry for decades remembers the old joke: For a newborn, every joke is new. Because what ROSATOM has presented here on the subject of SMR is a story from over 60 years ago that could only have been something new for the “newborn” and laypeople. The IAEA had been trying to “sell” this to the public since 1960. It is the civilian application of these small nuclear reactors developed by the nuclear powers to power their strategic nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. (Also for icebreaking ships of the Soviet Union or Russia, this can be described as civilian use).

In reality, every previous project that has attempted to use SMRs for civilian economic purposes – where profitability, economy and the promised low operating costs mattered – has failed. The nuclear reactor was dismantled from the USA’s only nuclear-powered cargo ship 50 years ago and converted to diesel. Canadian nuclear heating plants were converted to gas and oil. Nothing came of the planned nuclear-powered locomotives, trucks, heavy commercial vehicles, seawater desalination plants, electrolysis plants and industrial heat generation units. Although a nuclear company came forward with such plans at least once every 10 years, they were never accepted by the business community.

So there is currently the lavishly presented Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant, whose towing through the Baltic Sea has sparked international protests – the others only belong to the category of visions, as was the case with the earlier ones.

IAEA also dreams – and unfortunately, EU plays with it

The IAEA published a report ahead of the COP28 conference entitled « Nuclear Technology Review – 2023 », which presents the main events and trends of 2022 and is considered by the agency’s experts as a pathfinder for the future development of the global nuclear industry.

We focus on the most significant and interesting ones.

Increase in nuclear capacity

The IAEA has increased its forecast for the development of the global nuclear industry in the last two years. According to the optimistic forecast, the installed capacity of nuclear power plants worldwide could reach 873 GW by 2050. This would be 10 percent higher than last year’s forecast. This could increase the share of nuclear energy in the global energy basket from the current 9.8 percent to 14 percent. (This was roughly the case before the Chernobyl meltdown   .) Realizing this forecast will require a major shift to long-term operation, which means extending the life of existing reactors and building about 600 GW of new nuclear production capacity over the next 30 years.

It is quite shocking that the UN organization, whose main task should be the protection of nuclear safety, supports the systematic extension of the operational life of old, expired nuclear reactors, which obviously means an increase in risk and, incidentally, contradicts the previous principles of the IAEA!

And of course, Rosatom contributes significantly to achieving this goal. The state-owned company is building 22 power plant blocks in seven countries. The project portfolio includes a total of 33 units in 10 countries. The state-owned company has built 18 high-performance units in 18 years, nine of which were outside Russia. This year, fuel was delivered to the Akkuyu nuclear power plant under construction in Turkey and the Ruppur nuclear power plant in Bangladesh.

It is interesting that the IAEA does not say a word about the Belarusian Astravets nuclear power plant, which is also in operation – perhaps not by chance, as there are serious technical problems with the new VVER-2000 reactors. These reactors are also to be taken over by the Hungarian Paks2 project.

Difficulties in financing nuclear projects are hindering the construction of new nuclear capacity, study finds. However, there are “positive” developments, with nuclear energy being included in the sustainable finance taxonomy of the European Union and other countries in 2022.

What is taxonomy? Taxonomy is a tax system, which in this case means that nuclear energy and natural gas are considered “green” to enable the complete phase-out of coal and oil while meeting carbon emissions reduction targets. This would be the basis for the EU program to develop a green economy, the Green Deal. Behind this was a formal nuclear coalition: France under Macron, Hungary under Orbán, the Czech Republic, Poland – but above all Russia under Putin, for which both nuclear energy and gas would have been huge business.

Of course many people protested against it. Greens, professional associations. I – as a Hungarian city council member, member of the European Committee of the Regions and member of Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW)   – presented the case for plenary debate in December 2021. The European Parliament rejected the taxonomy. Nevertheless, the European Commission pushed through the taxonomy on December 31, 2021, on New Year’s Eve (!!). At this point, Russian tanks were already massing on the Ukrainian border. Everyone knows what happened next.

Small nuclear power plants

A current trend identified by the IAEA is interest in small-scale nuclear energy production. “Small nuclear power plants, along with high-performance water-cooled reactors, are expected to account for the majority of capacity additions over the next three decades,” the report says. of course in cooperation with the promotion of Rosatom projects..

Rosatom has commissioned the world’s first floating nuclear power plant, the Lomonosov Academic Floating Power Plant, and has begun implementing three more small floating nuclear power plant projects. The first four floating nuclear power plants provide power to the Baimsky Mining and Processing Complex. The second will be a small mainland nuclear power plant in Yakutia.

In addition, Rosatom is working on the construction of a small-scale nuclear power plant based on the Shelf-M reactor to supply energy to the Sovetskaya Gavan and neighboring areas. In total, Rosatom has about a dozen plans for the development of small nuclear power plants at various stages of development. Rosatom is actively negotiating with various governments, particularly Mongolia and Myanmar, to build small nuclear power plants.

The report states that modernized versions of water-cooled reactors are increasingly being considered, studied and built to gradually become modern, more efficient, semi-closed or “closed” ! Introduce fuel cycles. (A closed fuel cycle without waste production does not exist!)

“In the Russian Federation, conceptual research is underway on innovative water-moderated reactors with supercritical coolant parameters, including fast neutronic applications. The latest developments focus on small modular variants with an emphasis on improved nuclear safety, nuclear protective equipment, economic efficiency and sustainability parameters. » In addition, the development of Rosatom’s spectrally controlled VVER-S reactor is at an advanced stage. Among the promising technologies are also called salt bath reactors.”

Rosatom is also developing in this area, but not for energy purposes. The aim of the research is to test the transmutation of minor actinides in order to produce lower-activity fissile substances. This salt bath reactor is scheduled to be commissioned in 2030.

Note: not lower-activity, but perhaps shorter-lived isotopes (and not fissile material, but waste) can be produced with transmutation, but only with very poor efficiency.

“The report devotes a separate chapter to fast neutronic reactors.”

There are five fast neutron-cooled sodium reactors worldwide. One in China, one in India and three in Russia. Rosatom also plans to build the BN-1200 fast neutron reactor with 1200 MW of electrical power. According to plans, the first concrete for the BN-1200 will be poured into the block body in 2027.

“Technologies that use liquid metal coolants are receiving increasing attention. Rosatom is a leader here and is the first in the world to build the BREST OD-300 experimental demonstration reactor with 300 MW of electrical power.”

The characteristic feature of fast neutron technology is that the reactors operate at high temperatures in the strained operating mode with a high risk. Cooling with liquid metals.   Most importantly, they produce plutonium, suitable for both nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel. Precisely for this reason they were not encouraged and even banned from spreading. Previous attempts in Germany, France, Sweden and even Czechoslovakia and Romania (!!) failed. It is truly shocking that this technology, which is extremely dangerous from a safety perspective, is now being promoted again.

The other applications of atomic energy

As mentioned in the report, the greatest interest in the non-electricity applications of reactor technologies is heat generation – alone or in conjunction with electricity (district heating and heat supply for industrial enterprises), seawater desalination and hydrogen production. Rosatom also deals with these areas and carries out developments. The Lomonosov floating nuclear power plant in Chukotka also supplies heat to the town of Pevek.

“A desalination plant designed and installed by Rosatom will be installed at the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant to serve the reactors and to meet the needs of drinking and fire-fighting water.”

The commissioning of an experimental plant for hydrogen production through electrolysis is planned at the Kola nuclear power plant. In addition, Rosatom is developing a project for a plant with an annual hydrogen production capacity of about 110,000 tons, using a 200 MW high-temperature gas-cooled reactor and chemical technology. The first unit is expected to be operational in 2032.

Natural uranium

NAÜ experts – citing global forecasts – estimate that demand for uranium will rise from about 160 million pounds of uranium oxide annually to about 190 million pounds over the next five years. “Due to the expected further increase in spot prices for the uranium market, the procurement departments of nuclear power plants are expected to give preference to the early acquisition of uranium ore concentrate and again enter into long-term contracts with uranium suppliers. This could lead to a further increase in the immediate price of uranium, which is forecast to rise to $65/ton by 2027, compared to the previous price of $52/ton – the report said. Reality is already exceeding expectations: on December 4, 2023, the spot price for uranium was $81.45/pound.

“New uranium mines are expected to open in the next five to 10 years, including in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mauritania and Namibia. “

And not just there. In Europe we know of at least ten new uranium mining projects. In southwest Hungary, uranium mining near the city of Pécs is to be reopened; in Germany there is the former Wismut project in the Elbe valley.

However, the planned production capacity of these new facilities will not be sufficient to meet the current shortage of supply, which is currently being met from secondary sources. In this regard, uranium exploration is expected to increase in the coming years, including both conventional and non-conventional sites,” state NAÜ experts.

“Rosatom is also developing sites and conducting exploration work in Russia and Kazakhstan and launching projects in Tanzania and Namibia.” (And in Hungary!)

Source:Rosatom News

József Kóbor dr.

Pécs City Council, Hungary, European Committee of the Regions, NTW

Link to the article in other languages: https://www.donauregion-atomkraftfrei.at/beitraege-ungarn/

NTW heard by the Senate on reorganising nuclear safety in France.

Project of law on the organisation of the governance of nuclear safety and radiation protection protection to meet the challenge of revitalizing the nuclear industry.

* * *

Hearing by Mr Pascal Martin, Senator, Secretary of the French Committee on Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development

* * *

Round table discussion with representatives of the Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire, France Nature Environnement (FNE)
and Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW).

The position below was presented at the hearing by Mr Julien Dewoghélaëre, member of the
Management Board of Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW).

Thursday 11 January 2024 from 10:00 to 11:00, in room 261 (15 rue de Vaugirard)

______________

The European network Nuclear Transparency Watch (NTW) was set up in 2013 following a call « for vigilance on nuclear transparency » by a group of around twenty Members of the European Parliament from different political backgrounds.

The NTW network brings together more than fifty members (individuals and organisations) from twenty European countries. from twenty European countries, and promotes a citizens’ watch on nuclear safety and transparency around nuclear issues.

In the spirit of the Aarhus Convention’s principles of access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental the NTW network seeks to :

  • Increase the contribution of civil society to the governance of nuclear activities activities (including participation in European research projects) with a view to improving safety,
  • Raise awareness among political decision-makers and European society of the need for decision-making processes in nuclear matters at local, national and European levels.

Nuclear Transparency Watch’s activities cover all aspects of the nuclear cycle: issues relating to nuclear safety and security, problems associated with the ageing and life extension of nuclear facilities, new build and the decommissioning of old facilities, radioactive waste management, emergency preparedness and nuclear safety.

In particular, the network is involved in European research projects on the above-mentioned subjects, it is also involved in partnerships with the European Commission on transparency in the nuclear sector in Europe (BEPPER report) and access to information and public participation (Aarhus Convention & Nuclear – ACN multi-stakeholder round table process).

In view of its activities and missions, NTW has closely followed the project to the reform of the French nuclear safety expertise and control system, and more specifically the planned merger of ASN and IRSN. On 16 March 2023, the NTW network wrote, with 12 European associations and 23 MEPs co-signing, an open letter to the French Minister for Energy Transition, Agnès Pannier-Runacher, to express its concern at the urgency with which the reform was being carried out and underlying the fact that the reform was not based on an impact study nor on any dialogue with stakeholders.

NTW also responded favourably to OPECST’s request for a hearing in June 2023 to give the NTW network’s opinion on the consequences of a possible reorganisation of ASN and IRSN. Its position on this issue revolved around four points that underlined the importance of preserving the qualities of the current French system:

  • The exemplary nature of the French control system, recognised as a model at European level and the importance of strictly independent expert assessment institutions,
  • The ability of the French control and expertise system to maintain a link between and expertise, as well as a pluralism of expertise that guarantees the quality of quality,
  • Maintaining a high level of commitment to exchanges and research conducted at European level on the various technical and socio-technical issues related the nuclear sector,
  • Maintaining the development of a shared safety culture and openness to civil society in the spirit of the Aarhus Convention.

Since this hearing, France has passed a law on the acceleration of procedures relating to the construction of new nuclear facilities (22 June 2023) and the OPECST report has been made public. Following on from this, a bill on the organisation of the governance of nuclear safety and radiation protection to meet the challenge of relaunching the nuclear industry was tabled in December 2023 and is currently being examined by the Commission for Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development.

In this context, NTW is today responding to the Committee’s request for a hearing to give the NTW network’s opinion on this bill. Its position on this issue revolves around four points which, in its view, highlight the risks of weakening the nuclear safety nuclear safety system presented by the bill in its current form:

Axis 1 – A decline in transparency, undermining the safety system and public trust public confidence

Contrary to the stated objectives of enhanced safety and transparency, some of the provisions of the bill seem to us to lead to a regression in this area in comparison compared with the current system.

Regulating the publication of expert opinions by means of provisions in the internal regulations of the new entity combining the functions of the ASN and the IRSN does not provide the necessary transparency. of the new entity combining the functions of the ASN and the IRSN does not provide the same the same guarantee as the current legal provision prescribing the publication of IRSN notices.

In the same way, referring the question of the separation of the expert appraisal and the separation of the appraisal and investigation processes is a step backwards in terms of transparency. On the contrary, this crucial issue should be at the heart of parliamentary discussions, because it raises the question of the guarantees of the independence of the from decision-making on nuclear safety. In the current system, which is seen in European research circles as a model to follow, the presence of two separate the presence of two separate institutions guarantees independence from external pressures and an internal requirement for rigour in the production of opinions. In the new system prescribed by the bill, it is to be feared that positive opinions will be published and the unfavourable opinions « forgotten », reducing the quality of the system’s safety.

This reduction in transparency and weakening of guarantees of independence threaten public confidence in the safety system. At Moreover, the opposition of a large number of IRSN staff reinforces the risk of weakening the safety system at a time when, on the contrary, it needs to be strengthened since the stated objectives are to increase the number of nuclear installations.

Axis 2 – Risks associated with the decline in R&D in safety and radiation protection

The quality of the current system is based in particular on the development of high-quality research to support expert assessments, which has been the fruit of twenty years of effort within IRSN to guarantee the quality of scientific and technical risk assessments. This high-quality is carried out at all levels (local, national, European and international). If the merger goes ahead, it will be essential to ensure that all research activities are transferred to the future ASNR. NTW has seen the driving role played by the IRSN in European research activities (particularly around the issue of radioactive waste management) and a withdrawal of the new authority from these research activities would send a very bad signal to the partners within the EU.

In addition, certain elements, such as the drafting of decrees preparing for the transfer of certain IRSN projects to the CEA, or the provisions of Articles 5 and 7 of the bill, which transfer IRSN’s assets, rights and obligations in the area of research to the CEA, present a significant risk to the autonomy of the expert assessment function (which needs independent research within it) and presage a return to the much-criticized situation that led to the creation of IRSN.

Axis 3 – Keeping expertise open to society

Over the past twenty years, IRSN has also developed initiatives to open up to society, giving citizens access to information and increasing their skills in safety and radiation protection, thereby contributing to the development of a shared safety culture.
For NTW, the bill must not be a step backwards and should include guarantees to preserve the innovative actions developed in this area: technical dialogues, inclusion of civil society in the preparation of opinions (example of the actions carried out as part of the fourth periodic review of the 900 Megawatt reactors in the French nuclear fleet), opening up IRSN research to civil society (Research Steering Committee) in order in particular to ensure that research also responds to society’s questions. In addition to reiterating the importance of this public participation, the bill makes no mention of concrete measures to ensure that these actions are maintained.

Axis 4 – A rushed project that is not compatible with safety issues

In March 2023, NTW, along with others, expressed its concern about the hasty form that this project to reform the governance of the safety system was taking. While the OPESCT report was a first step towards a necessary analysis of the benefits and risks of such a reform, it is clearly no substitute for a complete and contradictory evaluation of the existing system. This report does not that the current system is unsustainable, nor on the consequences of the merger. The current French organisation works well and has won the confidence of the French people, which was not the case in the past. Moreover, it is a model that is seen as positive abroad as positive.

For NTW, while rethinking the organisation of the safety system is understandable, the current project seems to be rushed, with a high risk of undermining the existing system at a time when the challenges ahead require stability and confidence. The date planned for the entry into force, 1 January 2025, leaves little time for the Senate and the National Assembly to consider the consequences of implementing the bill with all the stakeholders concerned.

Nuclear Waste Management in the EU: Joint Project Report

Nuclear Waste Management in the EU: Joint Project Report –

Update 2023

2023-07-31

Nuclear waste from NPPs remains an unsolved and highly dangerous problem, as spent fuel must remain isolated from the environment for a million years.

In an attempt to solve the nuclear waste problem, an EU-wide directive was introduced in 2011, the “Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste”. This directive tried to force EU member states to address the issue seriously, after this had been neglected for decades – thus immediately proving that nuclear waste has never been effectively dealt with.

The Joint Project has been active for years in monitoring the implementation of the Nuclear Waste Directive, especially with regard to transparency and opportunities for public participation.

The 2023 update of our report is available here.

EP&R: Is Bulgaria ready to react in a nuclear crisis?

Analysis by Dr. Petar Kardzhilov on the answer of the Ministry of the Interior to his application according to the Access to Public Information Act.

There is a delegation of responsibilities from the minister of interior to the Main Directorate Fire Safety and Protection of the Population (FSPP), which are not legally justified because, according to the regulations, they are expressly prescribed for the Мinister. On the other hand, there are serious gaps in the regulatory framework, which are a factor in an unnecessary and dangerous division between the structures of FSPP at the Ministry of Interior around the country and the regional and local authorities.

After the strong interest of 46,000 readings on the « Aktualno » website to the publication with questions in my application according to the Access to Public Information Act (APIA) to the Ministry of the Interior (MI), regarding the prevention and preparation in Bulgaria for a crisis with high radioactivity in the environment, I offer a comment and analysis of the answers in the access decision of the ministry , signed not by the minister but by director of the Legal and Normative Activity Directorate, Mr. Hristo Stefanov.

Regarding the first question, concerning the need for citizens to have prior knowledge of how to react in situations with high radioactivity, the MI answers that the preventive activity is carried out by the bodies of FSPP under the MI, although in the Disaster Protection Act (DPA) and in the Ordinance for Emergency Planning and Emergency Preparedness in the Event of a Nuclear and Radiation Accident (OEPEPENRA) there are duties and responsibilities assigned specifically to the Minister of the Interior. Neither in the act nor in the ordinance is written that the minister can delegate his duties and responsibilities to FSPP. In particular, no answer is given, for example, whether the Minister agreed together with the Мinister of Education on the requirements for training in disaster protection in the system of preschool and school education, which the latter is obliged to approve, according to Art. 16, par. 3 of the DPA. In the answer, there is also no information that the minister has coordinated educational activities in the system of higher education according to the following par. 4 and 5 of Art. 16. There is no answer to the question of whether the Minister has approved programs for training the population on behavior and actions in an emergency situation and for specialized training of the executive authorities on the implementation of the external emergency plan, for which he is obliged according to Art. 21, para. 7, points 5 and 7 of OEPEPENRA. No information is provided as to whether and how the FSPP fulfilled these duties that the Мinister illegally delegated to them.

Attention deserves the answer from the Ministry of the Interior to the first part of the first question: « In what ways, in which settlements, in what locations and how often do the specialized state bodies work with citizens to create, as well as refresh the necessary prior knowledge with the aim of strict implementation by the citizens of protective measures to limit the harmful consequences for them in case of emergency situations with increased radioactivity in the environment?” The answer is: « In MI-FSPP, systematized information is not processed and stored according to the criteria set in the application for the frequency and number of trainings conducted by FSPP authorities in populated areas specifically on the subject of nuclear and radiation accidents. »; The lack of such information and archive means that the citizens have no way to find out whether and how the statutory duties of the Minister directly delegated to FSPP are fulfilled, both to date and in previous years decades ago. From the overall answer to the first question in the application, according to APIA, it is clear that the MI does not implement the DPA and OEPEPENRA, which necessitates the need for legislative changes, both essentially in the regulatory framework for preparation and radiation protection, as well as for control over the fulfillment of the duties of the institutions liable according to the law.

From the answer to the second cluster of questions: « Are there external emergency plans developed for all regions, coordinated by the Minister of the interior and approved by orders from the regional governors according to Art. 9 of OEPEPENRA? For which regions and municipalities in the country do such plans exist, according to the provision of Art. 16, par.2 of OEPEPENRA and Art. 9 of the DPA? Please indicate where these emergency plans are available to the public? ”, after one page of general information, it is clear that the MI does not know at all whether and which districts and municipalities in Bulgaria have emergency plans. This means that the current or former ministers of the interior have not fulfilled the provisions of Art. 9, par. 17 of DPA (effective from 07.05.2016) – to conclude agreements with regional governors and mayors regarding the implementation of these plans: « (17) In connection with ensuring the implementation of disaster protection plans under para. 4, 8 and 10, agreements are concluded between the Minister of Interior, the regional governor or the mayor of a municipality and the persons under chapter four, section II.” In the answer to the question, there is no information that the Minister has coordinated the development of emergency plans for populated areas, which is his responsibility according to Art. 9, par. 3 and Art. 16 from OEPEPENRA.

From the answer to the third cluster of questions about siren systems for early warning, we understand that for 39.33% of the citizens of Bulgaria, alarming is provided with modern systems. That is, the people living in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Burgas, Ruse, Pleven, Pazardzhik, Montana, Smolyan, Kardzhali, Vratsa, Stara Zagora, Galabovo, Tsarevo, Ahtopol, the village of Lozenets and all settlements in the 30 kilometer zone around Kozloduy NPP may hear various siren signals, accompanied by a message of what type and with what threats the emergency situation is. In other settlements in the country, air raid sirens are used, without a voice message. Regarding the latest
ones, the Ministry of the Interior says that they are checked once every two years, but they do not say when they were checked for the last time and whether they are all in working order. It is also clear from the answer to this question that no serious tests and studies have been conducted, and there are no written reports on the audibility of sirens by all citizens in a given settlement, as well as on the audibility and intelligibility of voice messages and commands. We also understand that for this important part of radiation protection there is no documentation and no archive has been created.

From the answer to the fourth cluster of questions about prophylaxis with potassium iodide tablets, we learn that suitable tablets are available almost all over the country. I write almost all of it because of the expression « (…) as well as partially for the regions of Veliko Tarnovo, Lovech and Pleven ». Although according to the law they are obliged to buy and deliver them to the municipalities, the MI doesn’t answer the exact amount of tablets in municipalities, but they write that there are enough, including for foreign citizens and guests of the country. There is also no answer to the question of where the tablets delivered to the municipalities are physically located and how they are stored.

After another half page of general info, we indirectly get an answer to the most important question in this cluster – there is no centralized and uniform protocol for the time, places and ways of distributing the tablets to citizens: « According to the Ordinance on the Order of Creation, Storage, Renewal , Maintaining, Providing and Accounting for the Stocks of Personal Protective Equipment, the mayors of the municipalities prepare logistical schemes for the provision of individual protective equipment to the population if necessary, which are updated annually. Logistic schemes should be available in the respective municipal administrations. » Since each mayor decides for themselves how to distribute tablets, and the MI has no idea and control over who decided to do what, the result in the event of a crisis will certainly be panic actions and severe consequences in places. This leads us to the conclusion of a very serious gap in the Bulgarian legislation.

The answer to the fifth group of questions concerning evacuation procedures also speaks of a serious gap in the legislation. The MI admits: « The legislation in the Republic of Bulgaria does not contain norms obliging MI to collect and store data on the settlements in the country that have evacuation plans. Calculations for evacuation and dispersion in the event of a disaster/accident are part of the respective regional or municipal disaster protection plans, which are published on the website of the relevant administration.” It is grossly inadequate that the MI, which is responsible for the public order and the security of citizens in the country, does not know who, where and how should evacuate in case of a crisis. This gap is a condition for chaos, incidents, accidents, looting, exposure of citizens to high doses of radiation and other damaging events in a nuclear accident crisis or attack. The ministry doesn’t even know how many and which settlements have evacuation plans.

Even more unacceptable, absurd and in complete contradiction to the law is the answer to the biggest sixth cluster of questions from the application under the APIA, concerning the availability of individual means of protection for citizens in a crisis with high radioactivity. The MI writes: « The Minister of the Interior, respectively the MI, is not obliged by law or by-law to collect statistical data on the individual means of protection available in the country. Because of this, they are not obliged entities within the meaning of Art. 3, par. 1 of the APIA for providing the requests in point 6.2 of the application for public information.” How then, if they think that they are not obliged to collect data, do they fulfill the obligations of the minister, arranged in Art. 21, par. 7, point 13 of the OEPEPENRA: « The Minister of the Interior supervises the maintenance of the readiness of the individual and collective means for the protection of the population » ?! There is no answer to the question of how Bulgarian citizens can get life-saving protective equipment, written in a leaflet by “Kozloduy” NPP, uploaded to the website of the MI – FSPP: civilian gas mask, children's gas mask, respirator, child safety camera. The answer to this group of questions also ends with the admission that the MI don’t store information and don’t have control: “At the Main Directorate FSPP to the MI no information is stored according to the criteria specified in the application – what exactly, how many individual means of protection, where they are located, how many of them are suitable and how they will be distributed in the event of a nuclear accident.” Thus, when a crisis with dangerously high radiation level occurs no one, including the MI, will know how, with what means to protect themselves and, contrary to the more correct decision to stay in the buildings, many people will run in panic, which will most likely lead to far more severe consequences.

The answer to the last seventh cluster of questions about information and communication doesn’t offer other options for activation, except for the siren system, national television and radio, the websites of the municipalities, the FSPP and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency. With the highly developed modern telecommunication and online network capabilities, a much more secure and qualitative structure for information and communication can be developed, but, as can be seen from the response, the MI is not working in such a direction. Even the crisis call center, which is mandatory for every large-scale disaster/accident/attack, is not provided as an opportunity for information, communication and control over the situation by the structures of the FSPP in the country.

In conclusion, from the whole answer of MI it is clear the statement that there are several legal and by-law requirements in the DPA and OEPEPENRA, which are not complied with by the MI, because the institution does not accept them as their obligations. There is a delegation of responsibilities from the Minister to MD FSPP, which are not legally justified because, according to the regulations, they are expressly prescribed for the Minister. On the other hand, there are serious gaps in the regulatory framework, which are a factor in an unnecessary and dangerous division between the structures of MD FSPP in the country and the regional and local authorities. There is a lack of data on a sufficient number of quality activities for the preparation and prevention of crisis with high radioactivity levels, working together with the structures of the MI, local authorities, educational services, private organizations and citizens.

Petar Kardzhilov is a Doctor of Public Communications and Information Sciences at Sofia University « St. Kliment Ohridski », a specialist in risk and crisis communications, a member of the Union of Scientists in Bulgaria, a qualified expert at the international NGO for transparency in nuclear energy « Nuclear Transparency Watch ».

Abbreviations:
MI – Ministry of Interior
FSPP/MD FSPP – Main Directorate Fire Safety and Protection of Population
DPA – Disaster Protection Act
APIA – Access to Public Information Act
OEPEPENRA – Ordinance for Emergency Planning and Emergency Preparedness in the Event of a Nuclear and Radiation Accident

Sad news : death of Michèle Rivasi

We are sorry to learn the sudden loss of Michèle Rivasi, today, at the age of 70.
She was one the co-founders of NTW in 2013, and was its first chairperson until 2016.
She has been an elected member of the European Parliament (Green) since 2009.
Many people in NTW had the chance to work with her. She accomplished a lot for transparency on nuclear issues.
This is very sad news, NTW shares its best and warms thoughts to her family and closest ones.
Here after a memory of her time in NTW:

RWM : interactions with civil society on technical topics

In 2023, a new process of dialogue has started with the goal to experiment a joint work between civil society and IRSN on the basis of a co-constructed scenario (accident scenario in the operational phase of the repository or scenario of changes in the post-closure phase of the repository) with a view to a shared assessment of the associated safety issues.

Different types of participation were foreseen for the civil society from a general and continuous participation to a punctual and specific participation. In fact, three groups were established to consider three different themes during three different period:

  1. Basic data retained for the Cigéo safety assessment: site, inventories of radioactive waste intended for disposal, disposal components, etc. (April 2024).
  2. Evaluation safety in the operating phase (autumn 2024).
  3. Evaluation safety in the post-closure phase (mid-2025).

Find out more about it there in French: DT-DAC-Cigeo_Bilan-perspectives_12_07_23

RICOMET CONFERENCE 2023

« From August 30th to September 1st 2023, the Tabloo visitor center in Dessel, Belgium, played host to the much-anticipated RICOMET conference on social science and humanities research in ionising radiation, featuring a lot of RadoNorm’s research. This gathering of more than 100 social science researchers and key stakeholders was dedicated to advancing knowledge and fostering discussions on ionising radiation’s societal, ethical and socio-technical aspects. »

RadoNorm presentations, posters and sessions can be found on www.ricomet.eu.

Here below you will find abstract for NTW members presentation and pitch:

Cross-border consultation on Lifetime extension of Doel-4 and Tihange-3 (Belgium)

Paris, 15 June 2023

Subject: Lifetime extension of Nuclear Power Plants Doel-4 and Tihange-3 in Belgium.

Link to the Cross-border consultation on Lifetime extension of Doel-4 and Tihange-3 (Belgium)

Nuclear Transparency Watch as citizen network on nuclear safety and transparency with organisation, elected and qualified members in the European region (including Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) based in France has participated in the cross-border consultation regarding the Doel-4 and Tihange-3 nuclear power plants potentiel lifetime extension.

Participating to such consultation is not new for NTW, which as participated in the scope of the Environmental Impact Assessment to other consultation on Lifetime extension such as for Doel-1 & Doel-2 in Belgium as well but also abroad such as in Finland with Loviisa 1 & 2 or in Slovenia with Krsko.

… [En savoir plus]

Audition of NTW by the French Assembly regarding absorption of IRSN by ASN

The French National Assembly heard Julien Dewoghélaëre for Nuclear Transparency Watch, Tuesday 6 June 2023 at 5.30pm on the consequences of a possible re-organisation of the ASN and IRSN on scientific and technological plans nuclear safety and radiation protection.

The transcription of this hearing by Jean-Luc Fugit, Deputy and Stéphane Piednoir, Senator for the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technical Choices (OPECST) can be found here after: Parlementary Audition

On this topic, you can also find out NTW’s press release after that a coalition of NGOs and Members of the European Parliament have sent out an open letter with concerns for nuclear safety system in France:
https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/media/open-letter-to-the-french-minister-of-energy-transition-on-nuclear-safety.html

Furthermore, you can find ANCCLI’s Director, Yves Lheureux, views given to NTW, Monday 13 March:
https://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/media/update-on-the-irsn-dismantling-project-by-the-french-government.html

 

 

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