

Aarhus Round Table Temelin on emergency preparedness & response, 27 September 2014


Written input from the public

Situation in CZECH REPUBLIC

Temelin unit 1 and 2 disaster zone 13 km. In the EIA report of the new planned Temelin reactors unit 3 and 4 the disaster zone is reduced to 800 m around a reactor, evacuated within seven days after an INES 7 case. This EIA report is accessible on the website of the Czech Environmental Ministry MZP in Praha.

Temelin - flexRISK source term <http://flexrisk.boku.ac.at/index.html>

> 37.00kBq Cs-137/m²



CZECH REPUBLIC /AUSTRIA

Member of the civil society, Bernhard Riepl
Chairman of a Czech/Austrian NGO www.sonneundfreiheit.eu

I'm an Austrian, living (30 km south of České Budejovice, 60 km south of the NPP Temelín) and working (as a foreign language trainer) in the Czech Republic. I know almost nothing about emergency-plans in case of a nuclear accident, was not actively informed by the local, regional or national state-structures. Living and working among my Czech friends, neighbors and students I am not far away from the "real life" of the average Czech citizen respectively am in contact with them every day. It is a fact, that most of them simply have to work hard enough to master their own life and only in exceptional cases are they able and willing to actively inform themselves, to build their own opinion or even express it in public.

It is not completely true however, that people are not informed at all. There are even a series of newspaper articles, which looks like "reports" but of course are not. The people reading these "articles" (there really are people like that) are at least a bit informed (even though quite one-sided, because critics never have the money or resources to compete with the media-mechanisms

sponsored also by money with non-transparent origin). It is also true though, that a large part of the population simply doesn't want to know too much about problematic things, respectively doesn't want to be troubled by information, that would make their life even more difficult, than it is already anyway. They are busy enough to cope with life as such - where nobody is coming to help. Then, if finally somebody does come and wants the people to have their own opinions and even express them, they will hardly be fascinated, since they can't change anything anyway (individual experience) and would rather need direct support in lot's of other areas in their life.

And we must not forget, that the small structures in those countries are a reason, that almost every second or third family in the region has one or more relatives directly or indirectly working for the NNP Temelin, who generally earn better money than the average, who have to be happy if their company pays on time or even, that they have a job at all.

In order to stress this problem (that the real life of the people doesn't always correspond with the office-reality from a western European city) I'd like to mention my trip last weekend to the east of Croatia, visiting a Czech-speaking minority group. There is no NPP in the country, but in nearby Slovenia there is (NPP Krsko, owned half by Slovenia and half by Croatia). Even though the civil war took place already about 20 years ago, also this war (after 1991) is still a topic for the people (even for the state, since the region around and south of Daruvar has to pay less taxes than the rest of the country, due to damages from the war, still hampering the country. Not to forget the generally poor performance of the local and regional economy. This situation is even worse in Bosnia. I think, it is important always to see at least the 2 levels:

- a) the formal, administrative, state level
- b) the "real life level" - which is definitely important for the people and often does not have anything to do with "the official" and administrative political processes. Also media play quite different roles in the various countries.

If Europe wants to function well, it is important to reflect much more on the "real-life" situation of the people, probably also to put more money into the affairs of local and regional governments, since they are closest to the needs of the public and can solve a lot of questions much better in a pragmatic way, than big bureaucratic structures would ever manage. But of course it is necessary also to be careful, so that tendencies of corruptness will not lead to any abuse of the money available.

AUSTRIA

Participant from Austria, member of the civil society.

Heinz Stockinger, Independent Salzburg Platform Against Nuclear Dangers (PLAGE)

**NGO participation in official and semi-official processes that address the nuclear industry's
unsolvable problems**

- A call for utmost vigilance

I might indeed have worded it this way: processes by which essentially pronuclear official bodies and the nuclear industry try to *solve* their *unsolvable* problems. For this is what a number of offers made by state or EU authorities to NGOs in recent years is really about, and any more optimistic view seems illusionary to me. Mind, I don't oppose participation in principle. But there has to be a **real** chance of **our voice being heard by the public** and of **influencing the outcome**.

The two unsolvable problems – the very Achilles' heels – of nuclear power are (1) large-scale accidents with unpredictable movements of massive radioactive fallout and of populations numbering in the tens or hundreds of thousands, and (2) the reclusion of high-level radioactive waste for periods which are eternity to Man.

In area (1), I might recently have responded to an invitation to take part in an extensive workshop in Lisbon under the auspices of EURATOM on Nov. 28-29, 2013, titled "**Managing Complexity in Nuclear Accidental Situations - Experts Interacting with Experts and Society**". The very title implies that the complexity of such "situations" *can* be managed. Maybe so it can, to a large extent, when dealing with "small" accidents. But the Lisbon workshop was about the big-scale accidents ("*return of experience from Fukushima*"). In this respect, accident management can be optimised, and review participation by critical NGOs or personalities can push optimisation a little bit further – optimisation meaning here: some of the worst unpreparedness, mistakes, malfunctions etc. may be reduced, but unpredictability of reactor staff behaviour confronted with unknown patterns of accident evolution remains, and even more so unpredictability of the behaviour of large populations that are going to be, or should be, evacuated. The problem is by its very nature unsolvable.

It is therefore highly problematic for critical NGOs to participate – take an official role – in the planning of the aftermath of nuclear catastrophe, for that is what such workshops, conferences, symposiums in final analysis amount to. Just as in the case of (2) radioactive "eternity waste" management, such participation seems a grave mistake to me when it comes **before the source of the problem is stopped**, i.e. before operation of nuclear plants and production of N waste in a given country or community of countries have been irrevocably halted, i.e. cast in material fact (fuel removed from reactors; certain installation parts dismantled; etc.; besides appropriate, water-tight laws laying down the phase-out politically and juridically).

As long as these conditions are not fulfilled,

(a) NGOs participate in creating or spreading the illusion that a nuclear catastrophe could be handled, and could be so even in densely populated Europe;

(b) NGOs support, and give credit to, tendencies among policy-makers and administrative state services toward preparing populations for a life in a post-catastrophe context, toward accustoming people to such a perspective (in France, as the leading nation in nuclear PR, such tendencies are evident);

(c) on top of that, in the official PR accompanying or following the "participative" process, "we" – in inverted commas because the participation of just a few nuke-critical groups will be taken for the whole – will be presented as warrants for democratic procedure: "*nuclear-critical organizations have been provided a forum*", "*civil society has been able to discuss on an equal footing with industry and state representatives*", "*critical experts have been heard*", (...).

We have to be conscious, too, of the not-so-noble motives and reasons for which we NGOs might decide to participate in such smoke-screen processes:

1. Persons and/or organisations may feel flattered to be invited into such official processes organised by Europe's power centre or by a state government (ministry, agency, etc.); one's name, our organisation's name will be mentioned in official documents, just imagine!
2. For once, one may even get some funds, some kind of remuneration.
3. Awareness of the political consequences (as outlined in a, b, c above) may simply be missing.

To conclude, as an NGO or NGO representative one should, if at all, participate in such processes (via written statements, regular work in official bodies, working-groups) only on the basis of an unequivocal statement whose publication in the final documents must be guaranteed: *"large-scale industrial (and military) use of nuclear energy is irresponsible, catastrophic accidents of continental dimensions have happened and will happen again, which forbid further use of this source of energy; it is criminal to accept the perspective of vast areas and their human and animal populations being sacrificed for decades or forever, and to actively and consciously foster that perspective by promoting nuclear power even after Chernobyl and Fukushima"* (for what else should you call it when Abe or Sarkozy or Hollande or Putin etc.etc. take their chances on Tokyo or Paris or "merely" Strasbourg etc.etc. having to be evacuated, moreover knowing that this just could not be done, let alone decently done).

If such a position is accepted and publicised throughout a given participation process, and especially so in its initial and final documents, participation may be considered. Anything less will leave NGOs and other critics at the mercy of those who command and publicise the process. (The issue may be somewhat different for critical experts, who may sometimes "have to" come to grips with pro-side experts in scientific panels and the like. Still, by and large, they have to make sure in a very similar way that their voice will effectively get through to the public.)

One cannot always draw a clear line between sensible, clever participation on the one hand and naïve or even opportunistic involvement on the other. (Not only) France's antinuclear movement has been offering quite a number of unfortunate to fatal conflicts between "purists" and "pragmatics" or "adaptationists" (sometimes "traitors" to the former). Therefore, among NGOs, we should be as tolerant as possible towards other NGOs' methods. Yet it is for this very reason that we should make clear to ourselves beforehand where we have to draw the red line.

N.B. Throughout this *exposé*, I have been talking about **administrative participation processes**. Not about participation in **panel discussions on TV and the like**, for there we have equal access to the large public, or in other words, there we do get the level playing-field which critics have so often been barred from.

Current situation of nuclear power plants in Austria: Austria phased out and is nuclear free. "The Zwentendorf Nuclear Power Plant, situated near Vienna, Austria, is the only reactor in the world which has been completely built, but mothballed before it was ever put into operation" so written on the website of the owner. <http://www.nuclear-power-plant.net/index.php?lang=en>