Nuclear emergency preparedness and response in Ukraine: A first assessment

NTW WG EP&R INCEPTION SEMINAR

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The nuclear sector in Ukraine





Nuclear security risks increasing

- The lifetime of12 out of 15 NPP blocks will expire until 2020 (general decision to extend it)
- Decisions to extend the lifetime/build new NPPs are taken with violations of international good practices and Ukrainian commitments under the Aarhus and Espoo conventions
- Khmelnytsky two new blocks on the basis of old constructions
- Yuzhno-Ukrainsk lifetime extension of the 1st NPP (30 years of operation, 180 accidents, planned measures to improve security not fulfilled)



EP&R normative mess base

General conclusions:

- There are many dispersed acts (by-laws) sometimes contradicting each other no systemic approach
- Some acts were developed in late 80ies after the Chernobyl catastrophe but still valid
- Some acts that are needed are not developed/adopted (not a priority or there is a confusion over the responsibility)

But most important

□ Existence of acts \neq implementation



EP&R state

- No comprehensive assessment of the EP&R normative base and the actual implementation/state of preparedness
- Official reports claim everything is fine (systems are working, emergency plans at hand, trainings conducted)
- Unofficially experts/public servants say preparedness and response systems are weak (technical means of response, human resources, shelters, forecast systems ?)
- Failure to establish proper monitoring and warning systems (lack of money), the existing ones are obsolete
- No EPR awareness-raising among the population of



EP&R state

- Lack of coordination and clear division of roles among responsible authorities
 - EP&R Department of the State Inspectorate of Nuclear Regulation
 - Ministry of Health
 - State Sanitary and Epidemiology Service
 - State Emergency Service
 - EP Department of Energoatom (operator)
 - EP&R Departments of NPPs
 - Regional/local administrations
- Local actors (self-governance bodies, education institutions, etc.) not aware of their roles
- United state system of executive authorities for man-made
 ED&P



Case study: iodine provision

- Chernobyl accident failure to provide iodide resulted in a serious increase of thyroid diseases (100 times in affected regions, 8000 thyroid cancer operations of children)
 Today:
- Provision of potassium iodide is alarming:
 - Rivne region near Rivne NPP 53 %;
 - Volyn region near Rivne NPP 11 %;
 - Rivne region near Khmelnytsky NPP 33,7 %;
 - Khmelnytsky region (Netishyn town near NPP) 0%;
 - Zaporizhzhya, Kherson and Dniepropetrovsk region 100 % but the shelf life of the stock has expired



Case study: iodine provision

- During alarm tests the timing of the iodine distribution is not examined (Smolensk NPP tests showed that iodine prophylaxis in the zone beyond 25 km started only 10 hours after the "accident")
- Emergency planning zones are not defined in principle (various documents mention 10km, 15 km, 30 km zones of iodide distribution)
- Instructions on iodide provisions are confusing:
 - 1989 MOH order pregnant women should not be given iodide (WHO it is obligatory)
 - 2007 MOH instructions on the use of potassium iodide infants below 2 years old should not be given iodide
 - SDNR order says it is a priority to provide pregnant women and infants
 - Doses in 3 documents vary and do not comply with those recommended by WHO



What should be

done

- A thorough scrutiny of the Ukrainian legislation and its implementation
- Comparison with the EU legislation and good practices
- Encouraging a national/local multi-stakeholder dialogue to discuss the state of affairs
- Focus on information provision:
 - examining emergency communication plans and public awarenessraising programs;
 - polls in the communities close to nuclear sites on their awareness of EP&R measures and sufficiency of the available information, etc.;
 - a national ACN Roundtable on the creation of the national system of nuclear information units (CLIs), including discussion of their role in EPR;
 - Pilot project on nuclear information unit establishment
- Considering Regional NTW Roundtable on EPR



Thank you for your attention! We are looking forward to new partnerships and further exchange of ideas

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